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Futura Institute

Successful Jerusalem: Vision, Scenarios and Strategies

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Executive Summary

ow can the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem be resolved? The problem haunts the imagination of policy makers and academics alike. Hundreds of proposals have been presented over the years, but with little success. It seems that one of the major reasons for this failure has to do with the confusion of "what is desired" with "what is possible." It is precisely this confusion that this study seeks to address.

So far, the various solutions advanced with regard to the problem of Jerusalem have been based on a sincere belief that the desired future is also possible. This conceptual mistake breeds mistaken policies. Conceptually, what is possible is not necessarily identical to what is desired. Assuming that it is confuses the ought to be with the could be and the envisioned solution with a possible scenario.

Our approach draws a clear distinction between the desired vision and possible future scenarios. With regard to policy, this distinction implies a careful study of the barriers and opportunities strewn along the route that leads from the possible futures to the desired one. By identifying these barriers and opportunities, one can devise a set of strategies that can enable movement from the possible futures to the desired one.

The essence of this work can be summarized in three sequential statements:

1. Here in Jerusalem, we encounter all the hardships inherent in the current situation or in any other conflict-ridden reality;

- 2. Jerusalem has the potential to become the capital of two independent states, serving as a world city;
- 3. It is essential that we devise a set of strategies that will take us from the current reality, or any other conflict-ridden reality, to a situation in which the potential of Jerusalem can be realized.

Informed by these insights, we, a team of Palestinians and Israelis, embarked upon a project with three goals:

- 1. To chart a shared vision;
- 2. To develop of a set of scenarios;
- 3. To develop a set of strategies to facilitate movement from the possible situations charted by the scenarios to the desired vision.

The Shared Vision

At some point in the future, Jerusalem will be:

- The unique capital of two states: the State of Palestine and the State of Israel.
- An open city, politically divided yet physically undivided.
- A city in which people and goods flow freely between different sectors and the surrounding areas.
- A city of peaceful coexistence.
- A viable complex city with a high quality of life.
- A city of diversity and equality.
- A world city and a universal center of peace and conflict resolution, part of the global network of world cities.
- A city that combines the strengths of its cultural and religious heritages with tourism, financial services and information technology.

The Scenarios

We have developed 5 scenarios which we describe briefly below:

- 1. Besieged City: The occupation continues without change. Israeli policies in the city deepen the fragmentation of the Palestinians' urban and social fabric. In the shadow of the construction of the wall, East Jerusalem is cut-off from its hinterland and from the rest of the West Bank. The social and spatial segregation between the two national groups deepens, leaving almost no interaction between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Palestinians continue to live between the Israeli and Palestinian systems while belonging to neither. There is one municipality and the Palestinians continue to boycott the municipal elections.
- 2. Scorched Earth: The city is ostensibly "united" under Israeli occupation and control, but it is exclusively dominated by Jewish presence and dictates, most especially in the Old City and the inner neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority is on the verge of total collapse and the Israeli government is also weak, allowing extremists on both sides to control the political scene. Citing demographic and security considerations, the Israeli government unilaterally separates parts of East Jerusalem from the rest of the city of Jerusalem. The Palestinians, formerly under "civil" Israeli occupation within the city, now find themselves under an even harsher occupation in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, which has become a security zone under full Israeli control. Everyday life has been almost completely disrupted, and the international community has retreated.
- 3. Bi-National City: The occupation continues and Palestinians within the city take part in municipal politics. There is one municipality with a dominant Palestinian representation and role, due to the Palestinians' relative demographic weight; this points to the possible establishment of a bi-national regime between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.
- 4. Hybrid City: The two governments accept an interim agreement (formal or informal). There are three boroughs under Israeli sovereignty: Palestinian, ultra-Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish. The Palestinian

- borough has functional autonomy over daily life issues, excluding planning and security. The Old City could possibly be designated as a fourth borough with a special status.
- 5. City of Bridges: The two governments reach a permanent agreement two states with two capitals. The two capitals are politically separated, with clear political borders. Palestinians live in the Palestinian city, and Israelis live in the Israeli city. However, with regard to the holy places, movement, economic and commercial activities and work, residents are free to engage in joint ventures on both sides, to move throughout the city and to work on either side with whomever they wish, even though they live under different systems.

The Strategies

The strategies are the devices suggested by the Israeli and Palestinian teams, hence forth the Jerusalem Forum - the JF, in an attempt to bridge the gaps between the possible futures (scenarios) and the desired future (vision).

Assuming that four scenarios of the scenarios – besieged city, scorched earth, bi-national and hybrid city – could, in fact, occur, the JF developed a set of strategies designed to bridge the gap between each specific scenario and the vision.

The gaps between the scenarios and the vision are not hard to see. With the exception of the City of Bridges, not one of the scenarios is based on a permanent solution that includes two states with two capitals. In each of these scenarios, East Jerusalem remains under Israeli occupation and the Palestinians in East Jerusalem remain separated from Palestinians in the West Bank. The city thus fails to become the capital of two states; neither does it serve as an open and world city.

Although these gaps are common to four of the five scenarios, there are, however, basic differences in the nature of the gaps between the scenarios. The scorched earth scenario is the furthest from the vision, characterized by

further escalation of the conflict. In this scenario, the ethno-national conflict transforms into a religious-civilization conflict, as the wall cuts off part of East Jerusalem from the Old City and its environs. The hybrid city and binational city scenarios chart some improvements in the social and economic conditions of the Palestinians and portray some cooperation between the two communities. As such, they may serve as milestones on the road to the vision, signaling the possibility of conflict transformation. The besieged city scenario lies somewhere between the scorched earth and the hybrid and binational scenarios. Taken alone, this scenario attests to the perpetuation of the status quo.

Based on an analysis of the gaps, the team outlined four major strategies:

- 1. Escalation prevention
- 2. Conflict management
- 3. Conflict transformation
- 4. Conflict resolution.

Escalation prevention seeks to avoid or ease the scorched earth scenario. It is based on emergency measures initiated by the international community and supported by civil society on both sides of the city. The strategy of escalation prevention has three major components:

- 1. Restoring security and stabilization of the situation in an attempt to reduce violence and advocate for political agreement;
- 2. Engaging civil society in a search for a better future for each side and for Jerusalem:
- 3. Initiating a peace-making process that may lead to an interim agreement.

Conflict management, associated with the besieged city scenario, attends to the discriminatory practices that characterize the current situation and seeks to improve the situation by initiating a strategy based on eight components:

 Guaranteeing freedom of association to Palestinians and permitting them to re-open their national and service-based institutions in East Jerusalem;

- 2. Making policy-makers aware of the hardships confronting Palestinian and Israeli residents of Jerusalem by developing the Jerusalem Index (an on-going poll that monitors the quality of life in the city);
- 3. Promoting economic and urban development in order to enhance economic opportunities and social interaction;
- 4. Publicizing the scenarios in an educational campaign that illustrates and warns of undesirable outcomes;
- 5. Articulating a vision for a better future which addresses both policy makers and the public;
- 6. Reviving the centrality of Jerusalem by bridging the socio-economic gaps between the East and West cities and initiating joint enterprises, particularly in the fields of tourism and knowledge industries;
- 7. Networking within civil society to create a joint Israeli-Palestinian framework for analysis and on-going monitoring of the situation in the city;
- 8. Forming a network of divided cities in order to share and exchange urban experience.

Conflict transformation, associated with the hybrid city and bi-national city scenario, attempts to contend with a situation that, while different from the current situation, remains inherently unstable. In both cases there is still a long way to go toward the vision but some improvements and changes have already been effected. The challenge in both cases is management of a city that is either divided into boroughs or based on functional cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis in administration of the city. These situations present new opportunities for further transformation of the conflict.

In the case of the hybrid city, the proposed strategies are:

- 1. Melting down the borders between the Palestinian borough in Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories;
- 2. Empowering the Palestinian community;
- 3. Enhancing inter-communal cooperation.

In the case of the bi-national city, conflict transformation may take the form of:

- 1. Articulating a joint vision for Jerusalem;
- 2. Educating for a shared city;
- 3. Initiating and supporting joint ventures in the economic, educational and public spheres.

Conflict resolution, associated with the city of bridges scenario, charts the actions necessary to reach the end-state solution, based on two states with two capitals. The activities required are easy to list - but extremely difficult to implement:

- 1. Concluding a peace agreement between the two parties, including an agreement over territorial division of the city;
- 2. Creating an economic agreement concerning the nature of Jerusalem as an open city;
- 3. Engaging international support in the form of economic and knowledge-investment in Jerusalem;
- 4. Initiating dialogue across religions and cultures to promote tolerance and respect for the other.

Previous approaches to the problem of Jerusalem have been advanced by well-intended and good-hearted people who believed that it is possible to reach the desired situation in one giant leap. While we would hope that they were right, we believe that we must prepare ourselves for other developments, including further deterioration, maintenance of the status quo, and some improvements due to conflict transformation.

Our message is clear: It will be extremely difficult to move from the current situation to the desired vision. A realistic approach should strive for the highest goal of conflict resolution, but should not neglect other strategies of escalation prevention, conflict management and conflict transformation.

Reviewing the four strategies, it becomes apparent that civil society, the business community and the international community can play a significant role in improving the situation in Jerusalem and in guiding the two parties towards the desired vision.

Introduction

The question of Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive issues in the conflict. During the peace process launched in September 1993, which resulted in the signing of the DoP (Declaration of Principles), resolution of the issues related to Jerusalem were postponed to a later stage, in May, 1999.

But repeated delays occurred in meeting the timetables necessary to reach a final status agreement as planned. The result was the violent confrontation which broke out between the two sides in the aftermath of the failure of the Camp David II peace summit. That violence, at least in part a result of tensions surrounding the holy places, has had a negative impact on the city and its future.

More than ever before, Jerusalem has taken on mythical proportions for both publics. Israeli political leaders have continued to repeat the same rhetoric about a "unified Jerusalem," while Palestinian political leaders have focused on the demand for national rights for Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

The rhetoric and declarations on both sides are disconnected from the reality of the city. Jerusalem must be treated differently, taking into consideration that it is a living city that is precious to the millions of followers of the three monotheistic nations. Jerusalem does not belong solely to the Palestinians. Nor does it belong solely to the Israelis.

With no hope of peace on their horizon, the Palestinians experience a tense "on hold" situation, exacerbated by the construction of the wall. This has created a misleading calm and quiet in the city, enjoyed by Israelis over

the past year. But the quiet is a deceptive illusion, and it should not be believed.

The city is not only suffering in the political sphere. While the circumstances are very different for Palestinians and Israelis, the city is collapsing for both of them. This city cannot tolerate the absence of any positive progress and it cannot survive without intervention by both the parties engaged in the conflict and the international community.

The negative migration of the Jewish and Palestinian middle classes and the flight of educated families who have the means to leave the city have accelerated. Domestic and international tourism have come to a halt. The city is recovering, but slowly and hesitantly.

Even as it struggles to recover, Jerusalem continues to deteriorate functionally, economically, socially, politically and internationally.

Something must be done. Immediately. As this study definitively proves, Jerusalem will not "wait" passively for future solutions. The city cannot tolerate a vacuum.

This study is the result of nearly five years of work by the "Jerusalem Scenarios and Vision" group, supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and coordinated through the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) and the Futura Institute (Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies was involved in an earlier stage). This multi-disciplinary, bi-national team of Palestinian and Israeli Jerusalemites has created a series of scenarios and a vision for Jerusalem and has delineated a series of strategies to be implemented by local and international stakeholders.

The scenarios are the product of a complex methodology based on a systematic consideration of the perpetuation of, or extrapolation from, the current situation. These scenarios clearly reveal that in the absence of forward movement, the situation can only deteriorate, as the "Scorched Earth" scenario (detailed on page 45) so bleakly demonstrates.

This publication is intended to call upon decision-makers (Palestinian, Israeli and international) and upon the public at large to realize that the situation in Jerusalem is unstable and dangerous.

Public opinion plays an essential role in society, mediating and accommodating political and social change and guiding and constraining politicians. Political leaders, deterred by the political repercussions accompanying any compromise in the city and pandering to their most extreme wings, have kept the public uninformed with regard to the anticipated effects of proposed solutions regarding the future sustainability and viability of Jerusalem. As a result, the broad public has not engaged in the kind of informed debate that would enable citizens to develop, hone, and perhaps change their individual and collective opinions. Furthermore, no serious negotiation at any level concerning Jerusalem has taken place over the last five years.

Almost all of previous proposals for the future of Jerusalem have dealt with three aspects of the conflict in Jerusalem: sovereignty; management and control over the holy places; and municipal administration and jurisdiction. While these are, of course, three of the critical issues, most of these proposals have failed, crushed under the weight of Jerusalem's troubled history, conflicted present and precarious future.

In most of these proposals, Jerusalem has been treated as contested political space; few of them have attended to the city as a living, breathing place. Even fewer pay any attention to the practical and psychological issues that shape and frame peoples' lives or focus on the real experience of political/ urban/economic and social transformation.

In contrast to these proposals, which have focused almost exclusively on formal principles and general frameworks, the participants in this project believe that given the current situation, in order to achieve a viable resolution to the conflict in Jerusalem it is necessary to define the desired situation in concrete terms and to examine the obstacles to reaching it.

We believe that Jerusalem is a dynamic city whose people wish to live peaceful and meaningful lives. Unlike the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who have focused mainly on political issues, we attempt to integrate geopolitical formulas with social equity, urban planning and a sense of city and place. In contrast to "leaving Jerusalem for last," we have assumed that Jerusalem can, and perhaps must, be "taken-on first," serving as the catalyst for the resolution of the entire conflict.

Methodology

ow can the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem be resolved? The problem haunts the imagination of policy makers and academics alike. Hundreds of proposals have been presented over the years, but with little success. It seems that one of the major reasons for this failure has to do with the confusion of "what is desired" with "what is possible." It is precisely this confusion that this study seeks to address.

So far, the various solutions advanced with regard to the problem of Jerusalem have been based on a sincere belief that the desired future is also possible. This conceptual mistake breeds mistaken policies. Conceptually, what is possible is not necessarily identical to what is desired. Assuming that it is confuses the ought to be with the could be and the envisioned solution with a possible scenario.

Our methodology draws a clear distinction between the desired vision and possible future scenarios. With regard to policy, this distinction implies a careful study of the barriers and opportunities strewn along the way between the possible futures and the desired one. By identifying these barriers and opportunities, one can devise a set of strategies that can enable movement from the possible futures to the desired one.

Informed by these insights, we, a team of Palestinians and Israelis, embarked upon a project with three goals:

- 1. To chart a vision;
- 2. To develop of a set of scenarios;

3. To develop a set of strategies that may facilitate the movement from the possible situations charted by the scenarios to the desired vision.

Each of these projects involves meticulous and complex methodologies which are charted below.

METHODOLOGY FOR CREATION OF A VISION

What is a vision?

Future oriented and inherently optimistic, a vision is a coherent, emotionally appealing and convincing statement about a desired outcome – it is an articulation of the way we wish we could live here in Jerusalem.

The process of envisioning enabled the project members to "break out of the box." To create a successful vision, it is necessary to consider the fears and concerns about the future and to recognize the extent to which we have allowed these fears to cloud our thinking and obstruct progress towards peace. The worst-case scenario provides the negative motivation: it is what we wish to avoid. The best-case provides positive motivation: it is what we would like to experience, feel, and be.

A vision is composed of two parts: the visible part - that we can see and feel; and the invisible part - those political, cultural and social processes which make the visible part possible.

SCENARIO BUILDING METHODOLOGY

What is a scenario?

Scenario building applies systematic thinking and planning procedures to complex, dynamic and seemingly unpredictable realities by examining the interrelationships between the factors that influence those realities. A scenario is neither a blue-print nor a prediction. Although it is based on probability and plausibility, the scenarios we have produced do not forecast

what will happen; rather, they offer well-developed ideas about what might or could happen. Because scenarios show that the future may, at least in part, be shaped by actions and decisions taken by leaders and the public, they help to identify what has to be done to secure a desired outcome and avoid an undesirable one.

Scenarios can thus serve as important guides to strategic policy planning: on one hand, they can tell us what has to be done in order to avoid potential threats; on the other, they can show how to maximize potential opportunities.

How did we build the scenarios?

Scenario-building is a sophisticated process that demands that the participants ask many "what if" questions and come up with convincing answers that can stand the test of logic. While not necessarily agreeing on which scenario might actually happen, or even which is desirable, the participants do have to agree on the nature of the current situation and the factors, whether certain or uncertain, that may affect it. The structure of the process encourages complex, multi-dimensional thinking. Although rigorous, the process is iterative, participatory, open and informal and does not depend on a rigid planning instrument. The process is logical yet also allows for emotions and attends to values and positions. It simultaneously encourages consensus and stimulates creative thinking.

Scenario building by stages

The scenario methodology follows a series of sequential steps:

- Articulation of the research question, so as to isolate the section of the complex reality to be addressed by the scenarios. The Jerusalem Scenarios and Vision Team articulated the question: "What factors influence the future of Jerusalem and its people?"
- Creation of the system landscape. Based on knowledge and experience, the system landscape points to the multiplicity of factors likely to influence the future of Jerusalem.

- 3. Identification of key factors, distilled from the system landscape. Key factors reflect possible constraints and threats. They may also support and stabilize positive trends that could become influential in shaping the future of Jerusalem (even if they are dormant at this time.)
- 4. Definition of factors, with a description of the specific characteristic of each factor and a possible range of variations. The process of defining the factors was complicated, reflecting the different perspectives of the two groups. At the same time, these discussions involved an intense process of mutual learning.
- Creation of an influence matrix, which provides an estimation of the mutual passive and active inter-influences of the factors. This influence matrix captures the current reality and forms the "departure point" for the scenarios.
- 6. Articulation of the driving forces, based on the influence matrix and selection of the key factors. The groups chose the following driving forces:
 - Strength of Governments;
 - Occupation;
 - Role of Civil Society;
 - International Intervention.
- 7. Definition of the possible range of variation for each force, from current reality ("status quo") to positive and negative changes.
- 8. Generation of scenarios for the future.

METHODOLOGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES

To develop the strategies the group performed the following tasks:

1. Identifying the gaps between the scenarios and the vision through careful analysis of the barriers and opportunities strewn along the way that could either reduce or enhance the prospects of realizing the vision.

This was accomplished by wind tunneling (testing) the vision through the varied scenarios developed by the team.

- 2. Devising a set of strategies for each scenario with the aim of overcoming the gaps between the specific scenario and the desired vision. In so doing, special attention was paid to strategies that reduce barriers and to strategies appropriate for maximizing benefits.
- 3. Identifying up to three important actors/stakeholders and describing the necessary or desirable contribution which each one of these actors could make with regard to the strategies devised.
- 4. Charting lines of action for the main three actors in each scenario.



The Shared Vision

At some point in the future, Jerusalem will be:

- The unique capital of two states: the State of Palestine and the State of Israel.
- An open city, politically divided yet physically undivided.
- A city in which people and goods flow freely between different sectors and the surrounding areas.
- A city of peaceful coexistence.
- A viable complex city with a high quality of life.
- A city of diversity and equality.
- A world city and a universal center of peace and conflict resolution, part of the global network of world cities.
- A city that combines the strengths of its cultural and religious heritages with tourism, financial services and information technology.

The Vision Narrative:

The vision is based on the premise that Jerusalem will become two capitals for two states, each with its own strong government. Each nation will maintain its own national and municipal compounds in the city. We affirm that both the Palestinians and the Israelis have the right to self-determination and separate states; at the same time, we reaffirm our commitment to the economic and physical integration of the city. This vision is predicated, among other factors, on a common understanding that Jerusalem has the potential to serve as a world city and that, uniquely among the cities of the world, its essence has to do with holiness, respect, openness and tolerance between members of the three religious communities.

The two sovereignties, with their two capitals, maintain clear and defined borders within the city, yet Jerusalem remains open and non-militarized. Goods and people move safely and freely across the transparent borders that politically separate and functionally integrate the two cities, guaranteeing economic sustainability.

The vision attends to issues of economic growth: religious life and the Holy Places; culture; public services; education for peace; the media; higher education; and the concept of "home" for each of us, as individuals and as collectives. (See detailed vision below.)

We have paid particular attention to education. In our vision, both societies invest in their educational systems, recognizing that education is the key to creating peaceful societies. Each side takes responsibility for nurturing a culture of peace at home and vis-à-vis the other side. Schools that emphasize freedom, democracy and social liberties provide the best guarantees that this peaceful situation will flourish.

Resolution of the conflict between us is the impetus for the resolution of many of domestic difficulties as well. Both sides prosper. Jerusalem is central for both societies and is even able to help other nations still engaged in conflict.

A Detailed Vision for Jerusalem

Introduction

A vision is a statement for the future. For this reason, in articulating our vision for our city, we have worded it in future terms – this is the city in which we would like to live.

It is the year 2020, and Jerusalem is a wonderful city to live in. It's so difficult to remember what it was like before. So many things have changed: The basic experiences of our lives as Israelis and Palestinians are completely different than they were fifteen years ago.

Then, our city was militarized, filled with checkpoints. Now, we move freely

within the city, crossing transparent borders that separate our states and unite our city.

Then, a wall scarred our city; now we have mutually defined, secure and respected borders.

Then, conflict dominated everything we did and we devoted our time and resources to our differences; now, we have the energy to devote our time and resources to building our societies, to economic development, to social justice, to our separate and collective identities and heritages.

Then there was occupation; now there is self-determination and coexistence.

Then, our children grew up here and left our city; now, they want to stay, and we enjoy our families and grandchildren.

Then, there was terror and counter-terror; now we are safe and secure.

Then, we were afraid all the time and violence prowled our streets; now, we feel safe and hopeful.

Then, there were no tourists and our economy was failing; now, our streets are filled with tourists and our economy is thriving.

Then, we were depressed; now, we are challenged and excited.

Then, we tried to dominate each other; now we have found the balance between integrating and separating, between tending to our own agendas and cooperating with each other.

Then there was conflict; now there is peace.

It was difficult to reach this balance, to recognize that separation was the best way to live together, that there were challenges and changes that we had to face together, and others that each of our societies had to face alone. We came to understand that equality did not mean that everything was "the same" on both sides, or that we had to develop in the same way. In fact, paradoxically, there were many ways in which we helped each other to separate, to create the necessary distance and identity.

While preparing this vision, many years ago, we were reminded of the word of the poet, Gibran Khalil Gibran:

"Fill each other's cup, but drink not from one cup. Give one another of your bread, but eat not from the same loaf."

Resolution of the conflict between us has been the impetus for the resolution of many of our internal, domestic difficulties, and both our societies are prospering. Jerusalem is central for both our societies – and we believe that the lessons we have learned here can be helpful to others, who are still engaged in conflict, who are still divided and conflicted.

So, come, take a walk with us, through our beautiful, exciting, cosmopolitan, and beloved city. We have some surprises for you along the way.

Jerusalem's Stability is Based on a Process of Simultaneous Separation and Integration

Jerusalem is the capital of two states; we are two municipalities, with two municipal compounds, two educational systems. Our two municipalities cooperate in providing services, and along the borders between them, many NGO's and other groups that work on both sides have set up their offices.

We start our tour at the Mandelbaum Gate – once, until 1967, it was the crossing between Jordan and Israel. Then, after the Six Day War, Israel tried to erase that border, forcibly imposing unification on our divided city.

But the paradox was clear even then: the city that was "united" by force was always divided and rife with conflict. Now that we have agreed to separate, our city is more united and peaceful than it ever was before.

As we set out on our tour, you will notice, that Jerusalem is really two capitals for two states. We have clear and defined borders, yet people and goods

move freely through all parts of the city. We are politically divided, yet we function as one urban unit. Since we are two states, each with its own strong government, and two capitals, each nation has its own national and municipal compounds in the city.

Most Israelis live in the western side of the city and most Palestinians live in the eastern part. We function as both separated and integrated units. We like it that way.

The commercial area stretching from Salah Eddin Street up through Jaffa Road is a fine example of this cooperation: separate, yet commercially and culturally integrated.

There are many tourists and locals shopping here. Salah Eddin is the main commercial center for the east, as Jaffa Road is for the west; yet many Israelis shop along Salah Eddin Street and the malls to the east, just like many Palestinians shop along Jaffa Road and the malls to the west.

Do you notice how busy and pleasant our streets are? Look how colorful the storefronts are, and how much effort the merchants invest in the window displays. Both of the main thoroughfares have been turned into pedestrian malls, with plenty of parking along the side streets and in garages – although few people bring cars into town, since the light rail and, bus, and taxis serve these areas so well.

Underlying processes

How did we reach this point? Through the common understanding, on both sides, that both the Palestinians and the Israelis have the right to self-determination and separate states, but, at the same time, we maintained our deep understanding and firm commitment that the city cannot be physically separated or divided.

Both sides promote social and economic integration; there is a clear code of ethics that determines city planning and safeguards the rights and needs of each side. Peace has brought tourism and investment back. The psychological and regulatory limitations that once deterred investors, both local and international, have been removed. Jerusalem has been declared a Free Trade Zone, pulling in shoppers from both Palestine and Israel; customs regulations defend the economies of both countries.

On the eastern side, we see that the Palestinians have engaged in social and economic development and public education, creating civic pride. On the Israeli side, the government and landowners reached agreements that enabled them to develop the city center, which had long been deserted and neglected. Now, the city center is attractive again to the middle and uppermiddle classes, any many that fled the city are moving back – right into the center!

Active Chambers of Commerce on both sides work toward improving their commercial regions and cooperation between them. The competition and cooperation is good for all.

The Holy Places

Jerusalem is a sacred city, holy and sanctified to all three monotheistic religions, rich in religious significance and cultural heritage. But over time, religion was politicized and became a source of conflict; now it is a source of ecumenism and tolerance.

Yet now, look how well-maintained the sites are, unlike the situation in the past. The entrances are clean and efficient, the sites lovingly preserved. All signs are written in three languages, English for all the tourists and Arabic and Hebrew for all of us, welcoming people of all faiths.

In the Old City, there is an exhibition center for the three monotheistic religions, providing translated versions of the most important holy books and scriptures. The Christian, Moslem, and Jewish religious authorities share offices and administrative services, and cooperate between them. The three religions have a joint board and an ecumenical council to coordinate cooperation.

The changes are not only between the religions, they are within each religion, too. In the Western Wall Plaza, we see that the ultra-Orthodox no-longer attempt to dominate this sacred and historical place; now, there is room for every Jew to express his or her Judaism and beliefs, so Jews feel less alienated and more identified with their religious heritage and holy sites.

Palestinians of all ages can pray at the Haram-ash-Sharif. We see that the practice of Islam here is emphasizing its most lofty goals of human dignity and devotion. Religious enmity between Christian denominations has been curbed, so that Christian communities are flourishing again.

We are showing you the most holy sites, but let us also show you something else, perhaps even more telling: because of the way our city developed historically, there are Jewish and Christian cemeteries on the "Palestinian" side and Moslem and Christian cemeteries on the "Israeli" side. See how well, how reverently, they are maintained. Respect for the dead, we know, is a true sign of respect for the living, too.

Underlying processes:

We achieved this stage when the leaders of the three religious institutions reached the understanding that they should manage and maintain their holy sites and religious aspects of the holy sites in the old city.

This agreement is based on a common understanding that the essence of the Old City has to do with holiness, respect and tolerance between members of the three religious communities.

This process received an extra push from the international religious bodies, who declared that replacement theology and ideology be discarded, and in its stead promoted mutual accommodation and respect.

The "Cultural Mile" between Jaffa Gate and the Cinematheque

This is our own "Museum Mile" or "Golden Lane." It extends from the plaza at the Jaffa Gate and continues up and down through wonderful spaces such as the Sultan's Pool, the Artists Lanes, the spaces in front of the Jaffa Gate, the Yemin Moshe Artists' Quarters, the ben-Hinnom Valley, and the Khan Theater.

We are quite proud of ourselves. Jerusalem once felt besieged, parochial, and provincial. Now we love the cultural connections with the world and the exciting cosmopolitan feeling. There is always something happening here – concerts, exhibitions, festivals, street fairs, happenings, street performances – and whatever! In fact, so much is going on that this year, Jerusalem was declared the cultural capital of the Mediterranean Basin.

Once, Jerusalem was a bit of a backwater – but now, we even have our own Entertainment Section in the national papers. (Only these days, it's getting hard for a Jerusalemite to get tickets for concerts and theater!)

Underlying processes:

Artists and intellectuals have played a crucial role in helping everyone to learn new modes of conduct, easing enmity, and increasing tolerance.

We all understand that this process will take a long time, and that we need incentives to help achieve it. Communities of artists, professionals, intellectuals, and so forth have taken upon themselves to educate and prepare the public, each group in its own way.

Public Services

Since both sides emphasize their sustainability, we have paid great attention to social and public services.

Before, services were inadequate, especially in the eastern part of the city, but now they are efficient in both East and West Jerusalem. Each side has developed its own health, education, and welfare systems, which pay attention to the needs of both societies and are culturally sensitive. Some services, such as the postal services, are related to citizenship. Others, such as maintenance of the physical infrastructure, water, etc., are coordinated between the two municipal and national governments.

Let us show you, for example, Al-Maqassed Hospital.

This is the primary hospital for East Jerusalem. It is a bustling, busy urban

hospital, with a well-developed, well-run emergency room, neo-natal and children's wards, and particular areas of expertise, especially in preventative early-childhood medicine and diagnostics. As you can see, the hospital is airy and pleasant, with gardens and open spaces for the ambulatory patients to enjoy.

Most of the patients and staff here are Palestinian. The spoken language is Arabic, and the hospital observes Palestinian official and religious holidays. Yet there are some Israeli staff members and patients, who prefer this hospital, because it is geographically convenient or because they utilize its particular specialties.

The hospital prides itself on its patient-centered approach. Information and promotional materials are available in all three languages, referring patients and their families to support groups, lectures, and so forth. Staff has been trained in patients' rights and holistic models, with particular attention paid to creating informative and attentive atmosphere.

Similarly, we can see that on the western side, at Hadassah Hospital, Palestinians, Israelis, and Arabs of different nationalities receiving top-quality medical care.

Underlying processes:

The development of transparent borders has led to the establishment of a full complex of ministries, and each state determines its own priorities, level of tax collection, budgetary allocations, and so forth. At the same time, extensive international support has facilitated the development of hi-level public services.

Of course, development of services is a source of national pride. Yet, politicians and professionals alike are able to consider also need for services, to take into account the size of the population, mortality rates and geography – so as to not duplicate expensive, hi-tech medical treatments, while yet making sure that each state provides the best medical services possible to its own citizens.

The overall medical network has been well-developed, including referral of patients to the best hospital for his or her particular condition. Administrative procedures between the Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian medical systems enable patients to receive optimal medical care.

No less importantly, each side has engaged intensively in education for tolerance and acceptance. Quite naturally, most people prefer hospitals that are culturally- sensitive, but they do not find it traumatic to visit or be admitted to a hospital on "the other side." Thanks to these educational processes, the demonization and dehumanization that made people fearful of each other have largely disappeared. Most patients can overcome the psychological and emotional difficulties that prevented them from utilizing services on the other side, and the staff has been particularly trained to help them to do so.

Education

We would like to show you three different classrooms: an Israeli classroom, with all Jewish students; a Palestinian classroom, with all Palestinian students; and a mixed classroom, in which Jews and Arabs learn together.

Most parents prefer to send their children to homogenous, separate schools, within their own country. This is natural. Yet these homogeneous classrooms nurture coexistence and peace. Working in coordination, each side's Ministry of Education has developed curricula and textbooks that teach tolerance. We don't all agree on history here, but even our youngest children now understand that there are different versions and different narratives, and that each holds only a part of "the truth."

In the Israeli schools, study of Arabic (spoken and literary) and Arab culture is mandatory; similarly, the study of Hebrew and Jewish culture is mandatory in all Palestinian schools. Palestinians and Israelis are invited to give lectures in each other's schools, and there are many joint and exchange programs.

A group of Israeli and Palestinian scholars took it upon themselves to write the history of Jerusalem, as seen from the different perspectives of the two communities. Look at the maps on the walls and the displays on the bulletin boards. They show the phases of transition and change in Jerusalem – from conflict and competition to acceptance and cooperation.

And so, our children are firmly rooted in their own cultures and heritages, while they are open to learning and respecting other people.

Underlying processes:

Both societies have invested in their educational systems, recognizing that education is the key to creating peaceful societies. Each side has taken responsibility for nurturing a culture of peace – at home, and towards the other side.

Schools emphasize freedom, democracy, social liberties, and civil responsibility. We know now that true democracy and social liberty are the best guarantees that this peaceful situation will flourish.

We have engaged our media, too. Once the media were full of incitement and distorted images of the other. Now, they are actively promoting a culture of peace.

The Center of Knowledge

In the new part of the city, Palestinians and Israelis, aided by the European Union and the United Nations, have established a new university. This new institution, which specializes in peace studies, is very popular among overseas students as well as Israeli and Palestinian top officials.

The land surrounding the area of Mt. Scopus and the Mt. of Olives has been allocated to the institutional development of a medical area, together with universities and other educational, research, and/or service institutions.

Distinguished professors from all over the world teach courses and conduct research at these branches of our universities. Many overseas students join their Palestinian and Israeli colleagues here, and most classes are taught in English.

Once, our campuses were fortress-like, with security barriers and checkpoints. Now, the architecture fits the environment, and there are no fences or walls on the entrance to the campus.

This area was once the location of the Israeli national police headquarters, an imposing, domineering building that represented the domination and occupation of space. But since land is no longer a matter of competing "facts on the ground," the police headquarters have relocated. Gaining control of the land is no longer considered necessary to promote security, so land can be used to promote human capacities and excellence.

Al-Quds University and Hebrew University are very close to each other, but until fifteen years ago, they was little or no connection between them. Now, they function as two cooperating universities in a shared space, much as all the people in the city do.

Underlying processes:

The Israeli and Palestinian societies, together with the international academic and diplomatic community, have made world-class infrastructure and resources available for cooperative ventures.

Because they can cooperate, the two universities also share laboratories and four pensive instruments (especially in the natural sciences), library facilities, etc. Each side, of course, takes pride in its own national university and achievements, and in some areas, there is even productive and positive competition between the two institutions — as there is, for example, between Harvard and MIT; Cambridge and Oxford; the Sorbonne and L'Ecole Normal Superior.

But most importantly, higher education has been freed of the conflict so that it can fulfill its true role of increasing knowledge and enlightenment, rather than creating facts on the ground and symbolic victories.

A Prosperous World City

Here is the Jerusalem International Airport, which services both Israel and Palestine. Here, you see a group of tourists on their way to Jordan, passing through the airport security.

We could also show you the Allenby Bridge, which is busy, too, since Israelis and Palestinians both cross regularly to Amman (and Jordan, of course, is also benefiting from its proximity to our countries).

It is befitting that we end our tour here – and compare it to the scenes of the Mandelbaum Gate, that once cut off our beloved city.

Underlying processes:

The economic climate is positive and exciting, attracting entrepreneurs and investors from Israel and Palestine, as well as from the United States and Europe.

Home

At the end of the day, each of us goes home.

Jerusalem has always been a city of neighborhoods, and it still is. During the violence, the middle-class had fled Jerusalem, and neighborhoods on both sides suffered. Now, as middle-class Moslem, Christians and Jews return, we see the development of strong, well-kept neighborhoods.

People have a sense of neighborhood identity and uniqueness, and yet, as you go through our neighborhoods, you can't help but notice —we're beginning to develop a "Jerusalem style," an intangible quality that somehow unites the look of our city with Jerusalem stone and flowering gardens.

Our neighborhoods spread out throughout the city. Each neighborhood looks different, reflecting the people who live there. Some people prefer dense, urban neighborhoods; others are happier in more suburban spaces.

The neighborhoods on the Palestinian and Israeli sides have developed differently; homogenous religious or secular neighborhoods, for example, are important to the Israelis, but not to the Palestinians.

These are sustainable cities, with attention to all of the aspects that enable our city to grow and develop organically. Thanks to the prosperity that we are all enjoying, and the attention that both of our municipalities pay to the residents' needs, almost all of the neighborhoods are attractive, each in its

own way, with good lighting, sanitation services, and gardening. Open spaces are well-maintained – and we are very proud of our low-levels of pollution, thanks to strict regulation and enforcement on both sides.

On the Palestinian side, there are many new urban neighborhoods that have created a new socio-economic mobility for Palestinians that was not available to them under occupation.

Since the new planning system is in place, there are adequate services in each neighborhood – medical services; basic shopping; sanitation services; gardening, and churches, mosques, and synagogues, as the people desire.

And since we both have the resources, energy, and hope to invest in our homes and neighborhoods, urban rehabilitation for the slum areas has revitalized the city.

Most Israelis live in the western, Israeli, part of the city, and most Palestinians live in the eastern, Palestinian part of the city. But most recently, some Israelis and Palestinians are choosing to live in mixed neighborhoods, together. It is complicated, socially and politically, but they are trying it out.

We know that this mixed area will also be attractive to diplomats and other foreigners, which will grant this area a particularly cosmopolitan feel.

Underlying processes:

What has made this all possible? The Palestinian and Israeli municipal authorities cooperate wisely, so the land allocation for both residential and commercial construction and expansion is rational and progressive. Since infrastructure, such as roads and power lines, has been greatly improved on both sides, the parts of the city that were once peripheral and undesirable have become more attractive.

Thanks to dynamic urban planning, with strong input from community-based organizations and other civil society groups, we now have development plans for all of our neighborhoods. Thanks to these plans, residents know

their rights terms of construction and expansion, so there is little illegal construction, and strong enforcement of building and zoning codes.

Most of us do not choose to live in mixed neighborhoods. In fact, living in our somewhat homogeneous neighborhoods is an expression of our recognition of the separation that we must maintain in order to keep our city united. This is the vision that we wish for. Below, we list the scenarios: the possible futures which we could face.

The Scenarios

We have developed five scenarios which are briefly described below and presented in details in the following pages.

- 1. Besieged City: The occupation continues unchanged. Israeli policies in the city deepen the fragmentation of the Palestinians urban and social fabric. In the shadow of the construction of the wall, East Jerusalem is cut-off from its hinterland and from the rest of the West Bank. The social and spatial segregation between the two national groups deepens, leaving almost no interaction between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Palestinians continue to live between the Israeli and Palestinian systems while belonging to neither. There is one municipality and the Palestinians continue to boycott the municipal elections.
- 2. Scorched Earth: The city is ostensibly "united" under Israeli occupation and control, but it is exclusively dominated by Jewish presence and dictates, most especially in the Old City and the inner neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority is on the verge of total collapse and the Israeli government is also weak, allowing extremists on both sides to control the political scene. Citing demographic and security considerations, the Israeli government unilaterally separates parts of East Jerusalem from the city of Jerusalem. The Palestinians, formerly under "civil" Israeli occupation within the city, now find themselves under an even harsher occupation in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, which has become a security zone under full Israeli control. Everyday life has been almost completely disrupted and the international community has retreated.

- 3. Bi-national City: Occupation continues and Palestinians within the city take part in municipal politics. There is one municipality with a dominant Palestinian representation and role, due to the Palestinian's demographic size, which points to the possible establishment of a binational regime between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
- 4. Hybrid City: The two governments accept an interim agreement (formal or informal). There are three boroughs under Israeli sovereignty: Palestinian, ultra-Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish. The Palestinian borough has functional autonomy over daily life issues, excluding planning and security. The Old City could possibly be designated as a fourth borough with a special status.
- 5. City of Bridges: The two governments reach a permanent agreement two states with two capitals. The two capitals are politically separated, with clear political borders. Palestinians live in the Palestinian city, and Israelis live in the Israeli city. However, with regard to holy places, movement, economic and commercial activities and work, residents are free to engage in joint ventures on both sides, to move throughout the city and to work on either side with whomever they wish, even though they live under different systems.

Scenario 1: The Besieged City

Strength of Governments: The Palestinian Authority loses its ability to function on all levels. The Israeli government is unwilling to engage with the Palestinian Authority and tables the peace process.

Occupation: The Israeli occupation continues. Palestinians in the city continue to live between the Israeli and Palestinian systems while belonging to neither.

Role of Civil Society: Civil society collapses as the elite and middle classes in both East and West Jerusalem flee the city.

International Intervention: The international community continues to support the Palestinian Authority, avoiding significant support for Jerusalem.

The scenario narrative:

The issue of relevant partnership for peace is still an obstacle for direct negotiations between the two sides. Israel is engaged in unilateral action meant to serve solely Israeli interests.

The Palestinian Authority is unable to maintain security or disarm the militant armed groups. The Israeli government is unable or unwilling to influence public opinion regarding compromise in Jerusalem and is uninterested in placing the question of Jerusalem on the negotiating table.

Occupation continues. Israeli forces fail to redeploy from the West Bank or even to move back to the pre-Second Intifada, September 2000 lines. This weakens the Palestinian Authority government even further. As a result, the Palestinian Authority is unable to enforce its leadership on the national level. Local guerillas and militias continue to control the neighborhoods and streets of the cities and villages in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

Jerusalem is an ongoing source of hostility and conflict escalation. Due to the construction of the wall, the Palestinians in the city are financially and socially overburdened. East Jerusalem is losing its centrality and urban continuity with the West Bank, as East Jerusalemites are caught between two systems (Palestinian and Israeli) under one dominant Israeli system. This creates severe social, economic and political pressure, which affects every aspect of everyday life for the Palestinians.

In both parts of the city, urban, economic and political deterioration leads to the emigration of the elite and the middle class. Civil society is active but ineffective. Some Track II, Women's and other NGO's do meet regularly; they are able to reduce mutual negative stereotypes between elites but are unable to influence the general public. Due to the deadlock, the international community avoids any significant intervention in the city, viewing its main role as preservation and protection of the Palestinian community in three ways:

- 1. Strong warnings to Israel against any act that might threaten possible future solutions (e.g., Israeli confiscation of lands in East Jerusalem and expansion to the east by building in the E1 area);
- 2. Support for Palestinian NGO's and institutions;
- 3. Encouragement of Palestinian and Israeli civil society-based organizations engaged in Track II diplomacy and positive encounters.

Scenario 2: The Scorched Earth

Strength of Governments: The non-functioning Palestinian Authority is on the verge of collapse, with no domestic or international influence and no ability to resist Israeli domination. The Israeli government is strong enough to implement its unilateral disengagement plan in Jerusalem.

Occupation: Occupation continues and intensifies. Construction of the Wall generates further ethnic cleansing and increasingly expels Palestinian Jerusalemites to the West Bank where the Palestinian authority is unable to provide for any of their needs.

Role of Civil Society: Civil society is weak. Moderates and peace entrepreneurs are regarded as traitors and extremists become the leading force.

International Intervention: The international community retreats, except for humanitarian aid.

The scenario narrative:

Unable to take decisive action, political leaders on both sides pander to extremists and allow peace spoilers to undermine the last vestiges of stability and moderation. Neither side is able to limit or restrict violent extremism.

As the Palestinian population grows, Israeli policy-makers, concerned that Palestinians may constitute a majority in the near future, prefer to maintain the "Jewishness" of the city, at the expense of any pretense of democracy.

Israeli authorities push the Palestinians outside of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries, initially by deliberately making life untenable and intolerable; subsequently, by taking over large blocks of housing in East Jerusalem, including the Old City, and forcibly expelling their residents.

The Palestinians are deported over the wall into the West Bank. However, since the Palestinian Authority has essentially collapsed, it is unable to provide

for any of their needs. The humanitarian situation reaches crisis proportions as expelled Palestinians are forced into refugee camps. Thousands are on the verge of starvation. Politically and socially disenfranchised and lacking effective leadership, the Palestinians are unable to mount significant political resistance or to enlist any international intervention.

There is limited access to holy sites and the national conflict is increasingly redefined in religious terms. The humanitarian crisis provides fertile breeding ground for increased religious extremism among Palestinians and Israelis. Because of the violence and guerilla wars on the streets, supply chains to Jerusalem are broken and there are periodic shortages of gasoline, food stuffs, etc. Throughout Jerusalem, public services are provided sporadically, at best.

The anarchy allows criminal elements to act with impunity. Organized and unorganized crime makes life dangerous for all.

Within West Jerusalem, the municipal council is dominated by ultra-Orthodox and ultra-nationalist parties. The Jewish-only municipal council votes to prevent the few remaining Palestinians from participating in municipal institutions and the police issue a series of restrictive regulations over Palestinian freedom of movement, access to services, and employment.

Peace spoilers and extremists agitate against peace entrepreneurs. The jingoistic press completely marginalizes all moderates and all moderate positions. Both Jewish and Palestinian peace and human rights activists are assassinated.

The international community no longer believes in the Palestinians' nor the Israelis' sincerity or commitment to the peace process. It ceases to even attempt to mediate the situation. Jerusalem, threatened from without and within, is abandoned. It ceases even to attempt to mediate the situation. Jerusalem, threatened from without and within, is abandoned. The anarchy threatens to spread to countries in the region, especially Jordan and Lebanon, with their large Palestinian populations. Revolts and armed insurgence surround the region.

Scenario 3: The Bi-National City

Strength of Governments: The two weak governments are unable to reach any political agreement. The Palestinian Authority dissolves, while the Israeli government is unable to maintain the "Jewish character" of Jerusalem.

Occupation: The occupation continues but paradoxically undermines itself. The municipality is transformed to one shared by the two national groups

Role of Civil Society: In the absence of any significant political Palestinian government, the Palestinian civil society asserts itself and becomes actively involved in municipal governance from the neighborhood to the municipal levels.

International Intervention: The international community directs its main support to both civil societies.

The scenario narrative:

The weakness of both governments leads to the generation of a single municipality, with poor quality of life, decreased Palestinian national identification and increased Jewish disengagement and internal strife.

The power struggle between the Fatah and the Hamas weakens the Palestinian Authority. Attempts to find a compromise in the form of a government of experts are short lived. The political and economic siege over the Palestinian government is not eased. As a result, there is further deterioration in the Palestinian quality of life, reaching the point of a humanitarian crisis. Israel maintains control over security issues. The international community and neighboring Arab states realize that in order to provide some relief for the Palestinians they must assume responsibility for the humanitarian aid, social support and everyday management in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The international community endorses this form of intervention and provides economic support and social support for civil society.

In Israel, the political shockwaves of the second Lebanon war undermine the political and military apparatus. Polls clearly indicate that the public does not trust the Prime Minister and the Security Minister, and a large percentage of the public thinks that the government is corrupt and inefficient. The debilitated Israeli government is too politically weak to act decisively in Jerusalem; it is unable to either pursue final-status agreements or to impose unilateral decisions. As the city of Jerusalem becomes poorer and less attractive to the middle classes, the bulk of Israeli society "disengages" from its own capital.

As occupation continues, the Palestinian population in Jerusalem devotes most of its energy for survival: finding a job, a shelter and food supply. With little support from the attenuated Palestinian Authority, and with little hope for final-status or even a long-term, stable agreement, the Palestinians adopt a new strategy. They demand respect of human rights including the right to the city, which involves proportional allocation of public resources among the Jewish and Palestinian population and equal participation in decisions concerning these allocations.

There are many meetings between Palestinian communities and Israeli public officials to discuss the allocation of resources in order to improve the Palestinians' quality of life in Jerusalem. This is because the Palestinians feel that the Palestinian leadership abandoned Jerusalem and therefore they have to take care of themselves and deal with the Israeli government instead. The Palestinian national elite and NGOs, on the other hand, boycott the Israeli government and wish to influence development in Jerusalem through interaction with the international community.

The intense contacts between Jerusalemite Palestinians and Israeli officials stand in sharp contrast to the declining contacts with Palestinians behind the wall. The separation wall acts as a major barrier for political and social contacts between Palestinians and Palestinians. Many Palestinians, who in the past regarded themselves as sitting on the fence, belonging to neither side, now choose the survival strategy. First a few, then followed by many, decide to participate in the municipal elections. Subsequently, the Palestinians become massively involved in Jerusalem's political life, participating in Israeli-

appointed neighborhood administrations and voting in Israeli-dominated municipal elections.

Apathy, disenfranchisement and alienation among Israeli Jerusalemites deepens. Civil society groups work on peace education, and Jerusalemites increasingly accommodate the presence and full, egalitarian involvement of Palestinians in the life of Jerusalem. At the same time, because Palestinian civil society is strong and well-coordinated, from the grass-roots level through municipal-level leadership and elites, the Palestinians are, within a few years, to play a major role in the municipal council.

The Palestinians who form 40 percent of the Jerusalem population become the leading political party in Jerusalem's City Hall. The municipal structure is preserved under the same Israeli laws and regulations and planning system. There is one municipality over West and East Jerusalem including the Old City, with dominant Palestinian representation under Israeli sovereignty.

The central government in Israel and civil society within Jerusalem and outside Jerusalem are divided between those who affirm this process and those who strongly oppose it. Right wing persons within the Israeli government and within civil society seek ways to reverse the process by denying Palestinians the voting right. Nationalists within the Palestinian society condemn the participation in municipal elections, but others support it and argue that this is the democratic way by which Palestinians can have influence over both East and West Jerusalem. At the center of the debate is the future image of Jerusalem. This debate can be resolved in two different ways, which mark the possible outcomes of this scenario:

Outcome 1: The Palestinians participate in the municipal elections and become the dominant power in City Hall. Along with the ultra-Orthodox, they form an integral part of the city coalition, in charge of the planning and budgeting committees. In these positions they control everyday life in West and East Jerusalem and have a far reaching influence on the development of the Old City. The cultural affinity between the ultra-Orthodox and Muslim

cultures in terms of religiosity, modesty and relations between the sexes and respect for holy places strengthen the political coalition. The ultra-Orthodox-Palestinian coalition reallocates funding in a more just way, so that Palestinian life improves significantly and rapidly. This leads most Palestinians to accept the situation readily. Since the coalition has no political support from the Israeli government or from Israeli society, and daily life continues undisturbed, most Israelis accept this new situation, and the bi-national municipal council is strong enough to overcome the peace spoilers and religious/nationalist extremists on both sides.

Jerusalem is viewed by the international community as a successful example of a multi-cultural and bi-national city, where Jews, Muslims and Christians manage to overcome old animosities and develop the city to the mutual benefit of the two dominant constituencies and the three monotheistic religions.

Outcome 2: The Palestinians participation in the municipal elections result in an ongoing conflict between Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs. The two parties collide over the division of power and allocation of economic resources. The unbridgeable national programs of the two groups lead to an internal split within the municipality. As tension increases, the municipality becomes less effective and the city residents express their disappointment by condemning the city councilors and mayor and by avoiding participation in municipal elections. Under these circumstances, the Israeli central government, which was never happy with the developments in Jerusalem, decides to disband the municipality and to appoint a special minister to administer the city. The Israeli government is condemned by the international community for obstructing the democratic process, but is tacitly supported by Palestinian NGOs and individuals who regard the participation in municipal elections as an act of treason. This will lead to an apartheid system.

Scenario 4: The Hybrid City

Strength of Governments: The two governments are strong enough to control peace spoilers but are not yet able to reach a final status agreement. They manage to sign a partial agreement within the framework of the road map.

Occupation: According to this partial agreement, Palestinians have functional autonomy in Jerusalem in the form of a borough with limited security and planning responsibilities and full control over their daily lives.

Role of Civil Society: Moderates and peace entrepreneurs proliferate and are active, but play a marginal role. East and West Jerusalemites each live within two political systems; they have distinct political citizenship (Israeli/ Palestinian) and a shared urban affiliation (Jerusalemite).

International Intervention: The international community attempts to contain the situation by acting as a facilitator and supporter of peace entrepreneur activities.

The scenario narrative:

While both societies have tired of the conflict, neither government is strong enough to reach a full final-status agreement. The Palestinians reach the conclusion that, in the absence of full recognition of their national rights, they can achieve, at least for the time being, municipal recognition and autonomy.

The Israeli government is unwilling to renounce its claims to "a united Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Jewish people." At the same time, concepts regarding functional autonomy have gained political popularity and the government is under extensive domestic and international pressure to

remove itself from the eastern neighborhoods. It is clear that the Israeli government is not intimidated by violence/terrorist activity, but rather is motivated by the specter of a bi-national state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, while it is still unwilling to negotiate a final status agreement, the Israeli government is willing to reach an interim agreement (not limited by a defined timetable.)

The Palestinian Authority comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to reach a full peace agreement in the short or intermediate term. Preservation of the Palestinian national rights and prevention of further deterioration of the conflict are the primary motivations for the Palestinian Authority's decision.

Based on what it views as a "demographic threat" and a desire to avoid the creation of the bi-national city, Israel agrees to ease the occupation in East Jerusalem. It grants the Palestinians living in the post-1967 boundaries of municipal Jerusalem functional autonomy under a borough system, linked with a Palestinian municipality established in areas close to the municipal boundaries.

As a result, the city functionally sub-divides into three boroughs: Palestinian, Haredi and non-Haredi, all coordinated, monitored and politically controlled by the central city government. Each borough has some planning and local security. National and municipal budgets are allocated proportionately and equally to each borough, and each borough is sovereign to prioritize its budgetary expenditures and means of operation according to the character and preferences of its constituency.

Thus, although Israel continues to impose its sovereignty, it delegates limited security and planning responsibility to the Palestinian borough. Israel annexes settlements around Jerusalem and the highway road system connecting these settlements to the "Jewish City." This intensified building activity continues to be a source of tension, perceived by the Palestinians as the real obstacle to the peace process and an attempt to restrict the development of a Palestinian capital.

The holy sites become a powerful motivating myth for Palestinians. Their increased sense of injustice and deprivation - exacerbated by prohibitions and restrictions on entering the city - strengthens the religious aspect of the conflict. In response, wary of the role of religion and its potential to escalate the conflict, Israel eases restrictions on access to the holy sites in turn. Confidence that the holy sites are not threatened eases existing religious tensions.

Economic links with Ramallah (for East Jerusalem) and Tel Aviv (for West Jerusalem) are enhanced; as a result, some parts of the wall between Jerusalem and Ramallah have been removed. However, Ramallah and Tel Aviv continue to be attractive to the educated, the economically well-established and the middle class; negative migration from Jerusalem continues, reaching drastic proportions and threatening the city's tax base and ability to provide even the most basic services.

Violence decreases considerably on both sides, leading to an improvement in the sense of well-being for both peoples. On both sides, fear dissipates, easing hatred and stereotypes. Yet mistrust and the negative image of the other persist, so there is minimal interaction between the two societies. In addition, both societies feel the need to focus on internal issues, following separate agendas. This allows minimum communication and dialogue between both communities, which progress in a parallel, almost unrelated, manner.

Because the city is ostensibly quiet, the international community feels little need to intervene on a political or diplomatic level and concentrates on cross-borough democratic education activities and facilitating the peace process by bringing both sides to negotiations and guaranteeing that the cycle of violent action-reaction does not resume. In addition, they provide donations and funding, especially to rebuild of the Palestinian Authority.

In this scenario, as in the City of Bridges, East and West Jerusalemites have a hybrid identity. On the one hand, they both share an urban affiliation "Jerusalemite." However, on the other hand, while the Israelis continue to enjoy full national (Israeli) citizenship, the Palestinians still do not have a recognized and legitimatized national identity and are still subject to Israeli authority.

Thus, because it meets some psychological and socio-political needs, this scenario is, at least in the short-run, stable. Yet both sides know that the motivations for this arrangement are different and even contradictory. The Israelis hope that because the have provided the Palestinians with "municipal functional autonomy" in the city, Palestinians will form a "Jerusalem" identity. The Palestinians, however, while developing the hybrid municipal identity, do not view this as a desirable end-state. For these reasons, the scenario is inherently unstable over the long term.

Scenario 5: The City of Bridges

Strength of Governments: The two strong governments are able to resume negotiations over a final status agreement, to enlist public support for the peace process and to control the peace spoilers.

Occupation: The final status agreement brings an end to the Israeli occupation and defines two distinct capitals in Jerusalem for the two states.

Role of Civil Society: NGO's engage in cross-border cooperation in the fields of economic development, service provision, planning, conservation and preservation of the Old City.

International Intervention: The international community facilitates the implementation of the agreement and assists in empowering Jerusalem as a world center.

The scenario narrative:

Both parties recognize Jerusalem as the key issue and the source of political legitimacy. It is clear to both parties that without a resolution to the issue of Jerusalem, they will not be able to resolve the overall conflict.

As a result, both the Palestinian and the Israeli governments reach a final status agreement. They are strong enough and politically secure enough to do so. However, in resolving the conflict, Israelis and Palestinians approach the issue from different perspectives: while the Israelis seek to avoid binationalization due to demography, the Palestinians want to fulfill their national aspirations in the city.

This final status agreement marks a change in the relationship between the two national groups: there are two states, each with its own capital in Jerusalem. Domination and occupation are replaced with political separation and functional integration of the city. East and West Jerusalemites both live within two political systems; they have distinct political citizenship (Israeli/ Palestinian) and a shared urban affiliation (Jerusalemite). This reflects positively on the daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis and on the city in general.

The Old City is declared a special international area, administered by the two parties with the support of the international community. Peace entrepreneurs are active, promoting inter-community exchange. Professionals articulate a code of ethics for sustainable development, and grass roots organizations write a code of ethics for everyday life in the city. These codes spell out rules of conduct and behavior in historic and religious sites and the relationships between national groups. Preparation of these codes involved a remarkable public debate among both Israelis and Palestinians, proving that when they are called upon to deal with everyday practice, members of the two communities essentially strive for very similar goals.

The two municipalities coordinate their growth for their mutual benefit and prepare a joint master plan for the city. The plan relates to both sides of the border and aims to produce a more efficient system of land uses, avoid duplication of infrastructure and foster positive relations between the two national groups. It is clear that the prosperity of both sides is largely dependent on openness, international centrality and investment and cooperation across borders.

Jerusalem thus becomes an open, prosperous world capital, serving as a model for cross-border cooperation between the Palestinians and Israelis for the entire region.

Movement between the Scenarios

The five scenarios, presented above, describe either maintenance of the current situation – Besieged City scenario – or development toward another possible situation: Scorched Earth, Hybrid City, Bi-National City and City of Bridges scenarios. One common feature that runs through all these scenarios is that once they are reached they tend to remain unchanged. History, however, tells us that any situation is bound to change over time due to the rise of new forces and new actors. The implication is that the different scenarios described so far may serve as transition points in a longer path of movement that may lead from one situation to another. If this is indeed the case, one should better think not only about the process leading to a specific scenario but also about the process leading from one scenario to another. Analysis of these processes requires the adoption of a dynamic framework of thinking that searches for paths of movement between scenarios. The questions that arise at this point are:

- 1. What will be the paths of movement between the scenarios?
- 2. What will be the driving forces that may shape these paths of movement?

We have answered these questions by distilling out of the four factors that shape the different scenarios – strength of governments, occupation, civil society and international community – two major driving forces:

 The relations between the two political entities, Israel and Palestine, ranging from peace to conflict. The situation of peace reflects two strong governments that are willing and able to reach a peace agreement, to control peace spoilers, and enjoy international support. The situation of conflict is predicated on just the opposite. 2. The relations between the two societies, ranging from separation to cooperation. Cooperation reflects strong economic, social and cultural ties between the two societies where the ethno-national and political borders become almost transparent. Separation implies division and two separate systems.

Mapping the five scenarios against these two forces reveals an interesting pattern (See Figure 1). The Besieged City scenario, which is actually perpetuation of the status quo, is conflict and separation oriented, but it does not imply the most intensive conflict nor a total separation. This role is reserved for the Scorched Earth scenario. The Bi-National City scenario marks a greater cooperation and points to an unstable situation with some mitigation of the current tension and conflict. On the other hand, the Hybrid City scenario points to some progress toward settlement of the conflict due to the existence of a separate Palestinian municipality in Jerusalem, but it is predicated on separation between the two communities that resembles the status quo situation of the Besieged City scenario. Similar to the Bi-National City scenario, it does not imply a stable situation in so far as the two political entities fail to reach an agreement and to resolve the conflict. Finally, the City of Bridges scenario features a significant progress toward stable peace and greater cooperation across borders. It is predicated upon conflict resolution and cross-border cooperation, and it comes very close to our shared vision.

The paths of movement between the scenarios marked by the different arrows (see Figure 1) portray possible long-term changes in Jerusalem's status. One possible path of movement is deterioration from the status quo situation of the Besieged City to the bleak future of Scorched Earth scenario. If such deterioration occurs, which may be associated with a humanitarian crisis, it may lead to international intervention with the possibility of an imposed agreement on the two parties. The rationale guiding this path is that the situation has to be extremely bad before conditions will begin to improve. The international intervention in Kosovo should be kept in mind while considering this path of change. True, there are many differences between the two cases, but the principle of infringing upon the sovereignty of the State is common to

both. Such an intervention might be easier in Jerusalem in so far that Israel's sovereignty over the city, especially over the eastern parts including the Old City, has never been recognized by the international community. In this case resolution of the Jerusalem problem may serve as a catalyst for national changes including the rise of more responsible governments.


Social and political changes may lead from the status quo situation – Besieged City scenario – toward either Bi-National City or Hybrid City scenarios. None of these developments marks the end of conflict, but they usher in some improvement compared with the current situation, especially in so far as the Palestinians rights to the city are respected at the level of the individual. In both cases the conflict is managed and transformed into something else. In these scenarios, the two communities in the city, Palestinian and Israeli, have to cope with new problems of municipal administration, participation in decision making, and allocation of public resources. If successful, the experience gathered in these situations may lead to greater inter-communal understanding and trust, bring about some changes in the way the conflict is perceived and finally support a movement toward the City of Bridges scenario. On the other hand if these experiences fail they may exacerbate tension and conflict and lead toward further escalation.

It is interesting to note that none of the paths chart here leads directly from the status quo situation of Besieged City scenario toward the City of Bridges scenario, which is the closest one may come to our shared vision. To put it simply, the shared vision cannot be reached in our view in one jump. On the other hand, perpetuation of the current situation, the Besieged City scenario, is devastating for both parties: The Palestinians are deprived of national and citizenship rights, and Israel may lose either the national majority or its nature as a democratic state. This is a situation in which the current situation is undesirable and the desired situation is impossible to reach. And the question is what has to be done under these conditions.

This question becomes very relevant as we turn our attention to the political efforts to resolve the Jerusalem problem during the Camp David (2000)

and Taba (2001) summits, and through the Geneva Initiative. Without discussing the specific ideas, debates and interpretations surrounding these meetings and proposals, we note that they all share one common feature: the Jerusalem Problem can be resolved in one agreement that leads from the current situation to the desired one. Perhaps. But the realization of such an agreement requires the following: two strong governments that are willing and able to end the conflict and settle the issue of Jerusalem and control over peace spoilers, two communities that support a compromise in Jerusalem, and willingness and ability of the international community to support this process. None of these currently exists. Our analysis clearly shows that although much desirable the end of conflict cannot be reached in one jump, and the current situation may harm the interests of both parties. Under these conditions interim solutions should be seriously considered by the two communities. As far as strategies of action are concerned, it is recommended to consider, in addition to the well-trodden path of conflict resolution, other strategies such as escalation prevention, conflict management and conflict transformation.

Figure 1. Possible Movements between the Different Scenarios:



The Strategies

The role of the strategies is to overcome the gap between possible scenarios and desired vision. Four different sets of strategies were developed by the group in order to bridge the gaps between scenarios and vision. These strategies are presented below. We have not developed any strategies for the city of bridges scenario since it is very close to the desired vision.

Strategies for the Besieged City Scenario

Gaps and barriers

Contrary to the vision which envisages a world open city of equals and a capital of two states (Israel/Palestine), in a context of cultural/ethnic diversity and peaceful coexistence, Jerusalem according to the besieged scenario is a city of conflict and discrimination.

The city is governed by discriminatory practices, which are characterized by political, institutional and economic asymmetry between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. Urban planning is used as an operational form of power and as a tool of political control and social/ethnic exclusion. Through the territoriality created by urban planning and the building of the wall, the natural urban fabric of East Jerusalem is fragmented and chopped into scattered pieces lacking the economic viability needed for the vision of two capitals. Accordingly, East Jerusalem is deprived of its natural and national environs, leading to its marginalization after once being the central city in the Palestinian territories and a social, cultural and economic bridge to the Israeli

society. Subsequently, Palestinians and Jewish Israelis are living together but separately and unequally with little socio-spatial interaction.

East Jerusalem is moving on a trajectory of urban deterioration. Economic depression, harsh living conditions, crowding and restrictions of movement for the Palestinian population are leading to the migration out of the city of the elites, the educated and the middle class. In West Jerusalem, secular Israelis are leaving the city, too, due to the scarcity of employment opportunities, high housing costs, and the significant increase of the ultra-Orthodox population and its political power.

Both migrations are leading to the slow collapse of civil society in the city. At the same time the full Israeli control of the city, the Jewish control of East Jerusalem, the marginalization of the Palestinian community and the cycle of violence are undermining the moderate elements and encouraging the radicalization on both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides.

Those dynamics are exacerbating the national tensions and accelerating the process of animosity and mistrust. Insecurity and instability associated with the situation might hamper any prospect associated with movement towards the vision. It prolongs the harsh conditions of the Palestinian population, and furthers the insecurity of the Israeli population.

Opportunities

In spite of these difficult conditions there are still some opportunities looming in the besieged city situation that may help in realizing the vision.

- The current situation of "status quo" creates motivations for civil society to act in order to change the projected path for decline.
- Despite the absence of an official political Palestinian presence and the eviction of Palestinian NGO's from the city, some Palestinian grass roots initiatives are taking a stand to defend their rights to the city and to participate in the planning process. Such groups strengthen and empower the Palestinian civil society and may play a significant role in realizing the vision for the city.

 Several forces for integration already exist in the city – such as tourism, consumption, globalization and multiculturalism. With the hope of an alternative shared vision they may present mechanisms for building "functional" and "human" bridges between different populations of the city.

The question that arises at this point is how to move from the current situation to the desired vision by reducing the barriers and maximizing the opportunities.

Strategies to proceed towards the vision

Strategies chosen to achieve the vision will target civil society and NGOs, the private sector (the business community), the two governments, including policy makers and top officials, the media, the international community and public opinion and grassroots.

- Peace building through conflict transformation: This strategy is to be adopted by policy makers and the public. It requires the creation of a plan of conflict transformation with several milestones, a media campaign to support the process and close monitoring of public opinion through the development of the Jerusalem Index: a poll taken regularly that monitors changes in public opinion regarding the quality of life in Jerusalem. The main target groups are policy makers, the media and the public.
- Economic and urban development of equal opportunities and interaction: This strategy of economic and urban development bridges the gaps between the communities and fosters mutual interaction. This requires projects that focus on improving the economic conditions and opportunities in East Jerusalem, on one hand, and encouraging Israeli/Palestinian joint economic projects on the other. Encouraging participation in planning and setting the city agenda of urban development is an essential and integral part of this strategy.
- Reviving Jerusalem's international centrality: by guaranteeing freedom

of association for the Palestinians in establishing institutions to attend to their needs and expanding cooperation with the Israeli institutions. This should be done by acting simultaneously at the emotion, virtual and implementation levels. The strategy calls for the launching of an international board for Jerusalem, to create an international program for development and to engage in fund raising. Suggested projects include an Interfaith Center, a center of civilization and a network for divided cities.

- Networking civil society: This may be accomplished through the establishment of a forum composed of Palestinian and Israeli organizations, creation of a common agenda for the forum, participation in setting the urban agenda (including physical planning and economic development) and creation of demonstration projects in the social and physical spheres. An educational campaign and fund raising are necessary. In addition to this, and due to the eviction of the Palestinian NGO's from the city, it is crucially important to find legal venues and practical tactics that will allow them to relocate and resume their activities in East Jerusalem. This will strengthen the Palestinian civil society.
- Forming a network of divided cities and sharing/exchanging urban experiences. Relying on the experience gathered in Jerusalem, it is proposed to establish an international forum of divided cities that share and exchange knowledge about common problems and possible strategies to address the problems. While developing these strategies it would be important to adopt the approach of helping communities caught in conflict to see their plight through each other's "prism of pain." Such a concept can be a major catalyst for mutual understanding, future interaction and cooperation in the process of conflict transformation.

To realize these strategies, it is necessary to engage policy makers in dialogue and obtain their blessings and support. The private sector must be engaged in order to participate and contribute to the different projects. The international community can play an important role through lobbying and

advocacy, partnership and financial support. The media should be sought out and encouraged to provide supportive coverage. Finally, civil society is expected to take an important role in advancing the proposed strategies by shaping public opinion, active participation and involvement in planning and implementation.

Motivations to encourage the lines of action

It is, of course, one thing to suggest lines of action for the different actors, and quite another to identify the leverages that would make the actors act accordingly. In identifying these leverages, a distinction has been made between Palestinian and Israeli actors, and appropriate strategies were devised. This is indeed the most important stage in the development of lines of action.

Through use of scenarios and the "successful Jerusalem" vision, the JF will create realistic alternatives to the current situation. By presenting the scenarios and vision, the JF will show to policy makers what they may gain and what they are about to lose if the current situation continues.

The following table presents the JF analysis of the actors' motivation and the suggested lines of action to be taken in order to realize this motivation.

Actors and Motivation	Tasks for the JF
Civil society: Palestinian: realizing national aspiration, a legitimate access to East Jerusalem population, and regaining the central national role. Israeli: gaining a central national role, return of middle-class to Jerusalem, and reviving the social life	Creating a joint vision as a catalyst for working together Creating a joint agenda for a successful city by bringing in Israeli and + Palestinian NGOs together
Private sector: Business opportunities	Create visions and programs for investments and development
Government: Palestinian: political gain; international recognition, public legitimacy, economic dividends, self determination. Israeli: easing demographic threatdemography, international recognition, international investment, economic dividends. Palestinian & Israeli: attracting world attention by setting a unique model for divided cities	Track the situation in Jerusalem by using the "Jerusalem scenario building approach" and vision(s)
Media: Innovative ideas that are worthwhile covering	Presenting relevant tangible creative ideas and visions
International community: Resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to guarantee: Israel's right to exist Palestinian right for self determination Regional stability in the Middle East Good relations with the Arab world	Making them aware of Jerusalem being the detonator of the "Middle East Bomb" Suggesting a strategy for removing the detonator Setting an example of peaceful coexistence and interfaith dialogue

We will address policy makers by suggesting the strategy of conflict transformation.

We will address civil society by highlighting the vision, new agenda derived from the vision, joint activities, and educational campaign.

We will address policy makers, civil society, private sector and the international community by suggesting the policy of reviving the centrality of Jerusalem.

We will propose to revive the city's centrality by creating a website that

appeals to a large audience. The JF will also encourage joint economic enterprises, social activities, cultural events and cooperation, international involvement of think tanks and universities.

One of the first tasks to be taken is organizing an international conference that focuses on dialogue across civilizations.

Strategies for the Scorched Earth Scenario

The "scorched earth" scenario marks the lowest point on the spectrum of possible scenarios that our teams have articulated. Thus, the scorched earth scenario serves as a warning and as an aversive motivator: this is the scenario that few would want to become reality.

Gaps and barriers

Completion of the separation wall, built unilaterally by Israel, is the primary barrier that prevents any progress towards the vision. The separation barrier negates the vision in all of the primary components noted above. It blocks any possibility of any cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. The unilateral separation leads to deterioration in the quality of life for Palestinian Jerusalemites: it cuts access to the Israeli job market; it denies health services and social security payments formerly provided. Separated by the wall, civil society groups cannot even meet.

The vision presents a prosperous and open society that encourages individual and collective creativity and stability. In contrast, according to the scorched earth scenario, daily life has become almost completely disrupted and physically dangerous, with the city divided into enclaves, some ruled by quasi-militias. Residents must invest their energies in individual survival.

The public and private mindset follows this political and social situation. Whereas in the vision, the prevailing social élan is peace-minded, positive and future-oriented, under the scorched earth scenario the public is warminded, depressed and beleaguered. Focusing on survival, individuals and

communities are reduced to thinking in zero-sum terms, while on the macro level, the conflict is changing from an ethno-national conflict to a clash of civilizations and religions.

Under the conditions proposed by the vision, peace spoilers can be marginalized and either co-opted or neutralized, but given the condition with which society must cope in the scorched earth scenario, it is unsurprising that the peace spoilers become centralized and even take over control of some areas of the city. Instead of the empowered, active civil society that the vision creates, civil society under the scorched earth scenario is unable to function and at risk.

Furthermore, while in the vision the international community is involved and supportive, in the scorched earth scenario the international community retreats, leaving Jerusalem to its own misery.

Opportunities

There are no opportunities embedded in the scenario. International intervention provides an external possibility. Otherwise, Israelis and Palestinians will have to learn "the hard way."

Strategies to proceed towards the vision

To move from the Scorched Earth scenario, we have identified three phases of activity and delineated the aims and actions that each phase requires.

Phase 1: Restoration of Security and Stabilization

This strategy must be adopted by both the Palestinian and the Israeli leaders, and must be implemented and reinforced by international intervention to reduce violence, moderate the extremists, melt division lines and generate momentum for political agreement.

Popular, grassroots support can be enlisted through production of a largescale, dramatic event that would call attention to the city's plight and, at the same time, "shake up" individual, collective and political mindsets. This will help to convince the leaderships and the international community that the residents of Jerusalem "have had enough."

Following this, continued grass roots organization and protests and engagement of international peace-forces could lead to stabilization and the maintenance of public order.

Phase 2: Engaging civil society in the search for a better future, for each side and for Jerusalem

At this point, the JF must identify and develop new leadership; empower the public; generate hope for an alternative future; create a new political culture; put Jerusalem back on the public and political agenda.

To accomplish this, civil society groups will engage in small group meetings, create coalitions, redefine and realign their resources within each community and between the communities. Enlistment of the business community at this time is crucial, because it is the business community that can provide the funding and the social pressure on the leadership to work towards changing the situation. At this time, the sides must begin to promote state-building and/or rehabilitation of existing social structures.

The sides must also begin working towards a <u>formal political peacemaking process</u>, <u>leading to an interim agreement</u>. The role of the international community is crucial, as it is the international community that can provide political, economic and social incentives; guide the parties towards interim agreements; and provide the resources necessary for political restabilization.

Motivations to encourage the lines of action

The following table presents the strategies to be taken by the JF to affect the three main actors:

Actor and Motivation	Tasks for the JF
Governments: Fear of loss of power; Public pressure International pressure	Lobby for international pressure Work with international groups and local NGO's and grass-roots groups to strengthen peace culture and ecology in the city, to raise resourcess for economice and cultural development, and to pressure policy makers.
Civil society: Deep motivation for an improvement in the quality of their lives	Generate hope and enlist civic and business leaders Help to build coalitions and melt the divisions Produce or co-produce the "dramatic event" Maintain pressure on governments Work within the informal educational systems Help to de-legitimize extremists

Strategies for the Bi-National City Scenario

Gaps and barriers

Lack of strong governments on both sides significantly weakens the prospects for a final status agreement between the two political entities. Furthermore, the weakness of the governments reduces the possibility even of a negotiation or coordination process between the political leaderships. As a result, occupation continues and the vision of two independent states with their capital in Jerusalem is not realized and, over the long term, the situation is unstable, insecure and unsustainable.

In sharp contrast to the vision, Jerusalem is not an open city, since East Jerusalem is separated by a wall from its Palestinian hinterland. The wall, which is still standing in East Jerusalem, prevents freedom of movement for the Palestinians. This separation leads to a widening gap between Jerusalemite Palestinians and the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza. Economically, the former enjoy access to the Israeli job market and to health and social services, whereas the latter do not enjoy a similar system of benefits. Moreover, Jerusalemite Palestinians enjoy access to power at the city level whereas the latter have limited power at the national level. Physically, there are significantly fewer contact options between Jerusalem and the Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a result, Palestinians' personal, professional, religious, and economic contacts will be cut off.

Politically, the Palestinians in Jerusalem will be heavily criticized for taking part in the Israeli municipal system. They will be accused of accepting Israeli control over the city, as Palestinian critics will argue that the bi-national city is actually an internal Israeli temporary solution that ignores the Palestinians national aspirations and the international community calls for just and lasting peace. Israeli critiques argue against the loss of Israel's unique capital which has been turned into a bi-national city.

The Bi-national city will highlight to the Israeli public that the occupation undermined itself. The ideal of Jerusalem as the eternal, undivided capital of the Jewish people and of Israel will seem ludicrous when the Jerusalem municipality could be governed by a Palestinian-led coalition.

The bi-national city creates an identity debate within both the Palestinian and Israeli publics as to the types of identity that emerge in the city and what kind of a city it should be. Roots for the conflict thus still exist.

The political and identity barriers create frictions among Israelis and Palestinians and within different sectors of the Jewish and Palestinian communities. Given a reality of an unclear political structure in which every

sector raises claims for municipal leadership – diversity can be a barrier rather than an opportunity. This barrier leads to a situation in which the different social sectors within the city attempt to dominate and undermine each other. This will make it more difficult to achieve the vision's themes of equality and diversity.

The internal tension creates a negative image. This may drive out the business community and it encourages the well to do middle class to move out. Jerusalem may witness further economic decline.

There is some improvement in the city's international image, but it is still not a stable solution. Under these questions the city is not attractive and prosperous enough to become a world city.

Opportunities

The Bi-National City scenario empowers the Palestinians in Jerusalem – giving them access to government and experience in policy/decision-making, i.e. planning, educational programs, and infrastructure development, and more control over their lives in the city. Thus, it could lead the Palestinian population of Jerusalem towards self governance, initially as a borough within a hybrid city and subsequently as the capital of a future Palestinian state. Due to the Palestinians much stronger influence on decision-making, this scenario enables a substantial narrowing of the economic and social gaps between Palestinians and Jews in the city. Thus it sets the ground for cross border cooperation on a more equal footing.

Empowerment and the narrowing of the socio-economic gaps and access to political power is an opportunity for the realization of the vision, in that it prepares the human infrastructure for a Palestinian capital and for constructive social diversity in the city. The peoples of Jerusalem will be given the tools to govern their city according to the vision.

This scenario strengthens the Palestinian civil society in the city, and enhances

its feeling of self-sufficiency; it also creates a new local Jerusalem identity for both Palestinians and Israelis. This enhances the possibility of constructive social and cultural cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians as envisaged by the vision.

Strategies to proceed towards the vision

- 1. Creating a joint vision for Jerusalem. The weakness of the two governments leaves a great void in the political arena which is filled by members of civil society. NGOs and individuals are bridging the gaps between the bi-national city and the vision by envisioning a different future for Jerusalem. The vision relates to the social, economic, political and urban structure of the city. It becomes attractive and tangible through a deliberate process of city branding. Groups of Israelis and Palestinians work together to create a common vision for Jerusalem. The vision turns to the city's specific and exceptional features and is made up of appealing slogans, joint programs and unique ventures, which distinguish Jerusalem from other cities. The vision and the suggested programs are seen as a constitution that guides future actions and plans that aim to bring about the desired vision.
- 2. <u>Education for a shared city.</u> The bi-national situation is used to encourage bi-lingual schools and joint educational programs. These enterprises should further the knowledge of the other's culture and encourage tolerance toward the other.
 - Another educational measure is joint seminars and workshops organized by members of civil society with the aim of building confidence and furthering mutual respect and understanding between the two communities. In this way this educational measure paves the way towards peace agreement.

3. <u>Initiating and supporting joint ventures in the economic and public spheres.</u> This should especially include economic cooperation for tourism, relying on the unique and attractive features of Jerusalem. Joint attention must e paid to logistics, especially the accommodation of tourists, transportation, restaurants and coffee shops, shops and the development of infrastructure.

In the public sphere the bi-national city provides a unique experience for cooperation in the spheres of planning and development. This should include joint planning and development of shared infrastructure: water, electricity and sewage. In addition to cooperation in physical planning, the bi-national experience should be used to facilitate joint management and cooperation in developing the city's neighborhoods and in running the city as a whole. This can be expressed through preparation of a joint master plan for the development of Jerusalem.

Cooperation in planning should focus on certain urban flagships such as the Old City and its environs and common public spaces used for dialogue and meetings between the city's communities. Careful renovation of the Old City can serve as international capital as well as a joint venture that pulls the different communities together. Another joint venture could include the establishments of cultural centers open to the different communities in the city.

Lines of action for the JF

The most important actors sought by the JF are the two governments, civil society and the international community.

The governments are expected to be open to the ideas of the vision that stem from the grass roots public and so are expected to be supportive of the joint projects.

Civil society will play a leading role in the suggested strategies. Dissatisfied with the current situation, civil society leaders will search for stability and

permanent peace. Civil society also realizes that this situation provides a unique opportunity to increase its power, hence its motivation to take part in the process. It has a sense of ownership and responsibility. It is engaged in advocacy and fundraising. It addresses politicians, media and residents, and takes an active part in implementation.

The international community brings to the city its knowledge, experience and seed money.

Motivations to encourage the lines of action

The following table presents the strategies to be taken by the JF to affect the three main actors:

Actors and Motivation	Tasks for the JF	
Governments: Losing power and control in the city Mutual distrust International pressure	Lobby for international pressure Advocate about the loss of power (media, seminarsetc) First steps towards planning and implementing the vision	
Civil Society: Dissatisfaction with the current situation and recognition of the opportunity to enhance power and influence	Highlight the dangers of the "scorched earth" scenario Showing the worst scenario Provide vision and facilitate building coalitions Empower Work with them to mobilize their resources	
International community: Search for spheres of influence	Present the vision Facilitate relations and cooperation with civil society.	

Strategies for the Hybrid City Scenario

Gaps and barriers

The continued occupation remains the primary barrier, preventing the realization of the vision: Israeli control over the Old City and the Arab neighborhoods persists and Jerusalem is not two capitals for two states. Palestinians can be Jerusalemites, but they will be Palestinians. As a result of his conflict of loyalty between their city and daily life and their Palestinian national identity, many Palestinians are branded traitors and there is great unrest.

In addition, there is basic inequality; Israelis can go everywhere (with the exception for Palestinians neighborhoods for security reasons) but Palestinians are not allowed to go to Israel.

In contrast to the vision, the governments are not strong enough to reach a final status agreement. The partial agreement they manage to sign, and the results achieved, may not be satisfactory for Palestinians on the long run. This will result in instability, insecurity and lack of sustainability and could lead to the deterioration of the situation rather than its improvement. Therefore in the long-run, and on the political and diplomatic levels, the international community's role is almost irrelevant.

There is an improvement in the city's international image, but there is no a stable solution allowing the city to be attractive and prosperous enough to become a world city. Even though violence has stopped, the image of the city is still not the inspirational image that the vision aims for and is not capable of pulling massive support or international admiration.

This scenario does not go far enough towards the vision; every opportunity becomes a barrier if it does not go far enough. It is both frustrating and self defeating.

The Hybrid City scenario is a functional solution, not a political one. It is the best way for Israelis to avoid a political solution. It fails to answer the national aspirations of the Palestinians, (although it does lead to an improvement in the quality of their lives.)

Opportunities

This whole scenario is more like a "dress-rehearsal" for the vision. Experience that both sides will gain in this scenario will accustom the inhabitants and the populations to the idea and the situation of how it would work and develop the momentum of getting used to it. The situation also serves as a training ground for the leaders in the three boroughs who can hence play a better role in the vision.

Strategies to proceed towards the vision

- Melting the border between the Palestinian borough and the Palestinian territories: One of the major gaps between the Hybrid city scenario and the vision is the existing border between East Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories. This border must be opened gradually and slowly, especially since the Israeli government will probably be satisfied with the current solution and will not be motivated to move towards a two-capital two states solution. Therefore there is a better chance motivating the Israeli government to melt the border and enjoy the economic benefits of cheaper labor, Muslim tourism and international support. This solution will also help close the socio-economical gap between the Palestinian Jerusalemites and the rest of the Palestinians in the West Bank and will give an opportunity to test the final status agreement in Jerusalem in a gradual process.
- Empowering the Palestinian community: In order to facilitate a future strong Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem the Palestinian local community must be empowered and prepared, through establishment of public institutions, provision of democratic education, and encouraging public participation.
- <u>Enhance inter-communal cooperation</u>: The open city in the vision includes a peaceful cooperation between the communities of the two capitals. To reach that stage of collaboration the inter-communal cooperation must begin in the Hybrid City stage. It is crucial to create

shared public spaces, enhance peace education, network among NGOs and CSOs, network and cooperation on the economical level and comanage the Old City.

As a group we will try to affect the main actors, urging them to take the actions that they should take in order for us to begin to move towards the vision.

Each actor has special interests and motives. This group can try to affect civil society and NGOs by forming coalitions and networks among the NGOs and CSOs. We would help these institutions with funding, gaining public credit and publicity in order to motivate them to move.

Vis-à-vis the private sector, we will market the vision. The private sector is interested in international and internal investment, cheap labor and tourism and the vision will boost the economy and prosperity in the city.

The governments are a main actor in our strategies. The Palestinian government's interest in Jerusalem is mainly associated with fulfilling the Palestinian national aspirations, so that marketing the vision and lobbying for it on the Palestinian side, through meetings with officials and politicians, will not be strenuous work. On the Israeli side however, which is interested also in public opinion, international pressure and economic incentives, this will be a more difficult task, since the Israeli government has now the upper hand. The strategy will attempt to bring officials to realize that the situation as is in the Hybrid City could ultimately deteriorate, even to the Scorched Eart scenario.

The media is an important player in trying to reach the vision. Media provide the mirror that reflects the situation and that presents the other, and it can play a crucial role in changing the mentality and perceptions of both sides of the conflict. As a group, we will hold conferences, invite journalists, brand and market the vision and carry out media campaigns in an attempt to get more people on board with us.

The people will be interested in the result of the vision for different reasons: while the Palestinians long for fulfilling their national aspirations, economic change and freedom of movement and worship in the city, the Israelis would want the positive change for the economic benefits that the vision will bring, in addition to security and sustainability and the absence of a fear that the security situation will deteriorate again towards violence.

Fear of regional violence, as well as the search for prestige and spheres of influence, will bring the international community to involvement in the search for a solution to the problems in the Middle East.

Motivations to encourage the lines of action

The following table presents the strategies to be taken by the JF to affect the five main actors:

Actors and Motivation	Tasks for the JF
Civil Society and NGO's: Funding Credit Publicity Fulfilling their mission	Networking and coalitions among NGOs and CSOs. Help in funding
Private Sector: International and internal investment Cheap labor Tourism	Market the vision
Governments: Israelis: Public opinion, International Pressure, Economic Incentives. Palestinian: National Aspirations,	Lobby for the vision – meet with officials, academics, writers, public opinion movers, media campaigns. Market the strategy
Media: A new "story" Personal conviction	Hold conferences – invite journalists Brand and market the vision – media campaign
International community: Solution Prestige Fear for security WWIII	Market the vision

Conclusion

For the past forty years the destiny of Jerusalem has lingered in a threatening limbo, a stalemated conflict of ethnic, national and religious issues. But history and time do not stand still: there are diverse trends in the status quo that could materialize into any one, or into any combination of the scenarios we have drawn in this study, some of which would seriously worsen the situation for both parties. The preferred option, of course, is to join in a shared vision to create a city divided politically but united physically. The path to that vision is obviously strewn with obstacles that could threaten forward progress. But we have seen that there are strategies and tools for dealing with those challenges. For those who want to share that vision, two action fronts are required. First, there must be a joint effort to alert our respective political leaders and respective communities to both the threats and the potential of the road from a failing city to a successful Jerusalem; secondly, jointly we need to solicit the active support of our respective civil societies and the international community in marketing our vision to the world. A physically undivided but politically divided Jerusalem, thriving in peaceful coexistence, could be a model for the entire region.